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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CREDIT INDUSTRIAL LOAN PLAN,
a Corporation

Appellant
-vs-

Case No.
8162

PURL F. PETERSEN and
CARMA PETERSEN

Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties in this brief will be referred to as
they appeared in the lower court.
The Statement of Facts as contained in plantiff's brief, pages 1 to 4, is accurate, however, defendants would like to point out that the lower courts'
action on the defendants' motion was not taken until
1
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after consideration of the plaintiff's memorandum
brief against the granting of defendants' motion.
Based on these facts the defendants contend that the
loan made by the plaintiff to the defendants could
not have been made under the Industrial Loan Act,
Title 7-8-3 U.C.A. 1953 because said loan was made
"on the security of makers" for a period of time in
excess of two years and specifically forbidden by Title
7-8-5 U.C.A. 1953.
The defendants contend in this brief that the
trial court did not err and that the judgment of the
court should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF POINl'S
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EllR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOAN IN QUESTION COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN MADE UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL
LOAN ACT, TITLE 7-8-3 U.C.A. 1953.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND GRANTING
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOAN IN QUESTION COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN MADE UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL
LOAN ACT, TITLE 7-8-3, U.C.A. 1953.
The statement of facts agreed upon by the parties hereto admit that the loan in question was made
for a longer period than two years from the date
the note was executed (page 2 of plaintiff's brief).
Plaintiff advances the theory that this loan could be
made for a longer period than two years because defendants gave a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of the note. Plaintiff's argument seems to hold
that because a loan has as an incident thereto a chattel
mortgage that it ceases to be a loan made on the
security of makers even though the mortgage in question provides for a deficiency judgment against the
mortgagors (makers of the note) in case the proceeds
from the sale of the mortgaged property are not sufficient to pay the indebtedness. (See mortgage and
page 2 of plaintiff's brief.) Clearly a distinction
should be made between a loan made on the security
of property mortgaged to the lender, which mortgage
and loan provide that the lender shall look only to
the mortgaged property as security for repayment,
and a loan which has as an incident thereto a mortgage to secure the repayment of a promissory note
with said mortgage providing that in the event the
:)roc·eeds from the sale of the mortgaged property
3
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shall not be sufficient to, pay the indebtedness that
the maker of the note shall be liable for the deficiency.
Defe-ndants contend that a loan made on the
security of property will be limited to that property
in the event the borrower does not repay and that
a loan made on the security 0f make-rs_ will pro.vide
for eventual and complete repayment by the borrower ~nd that any mortgage given by the borrower
will be merely an. incident to the promise to repay.
Any loan which looks. ultimately to the maker (borrower)- for repayment is made on the security of
s~id maker, regardless of whether or not a chattel
m_ortgage was given to secure the payment of the
promise to pay.
In this instance the loan was made not on the
security of the property mortgaged but rather on
the promise of the defendants to repay the amount
stated on the note in question. It could be argued
that the loan in question was made partly on the
security of the mortgage inasmuch as said mortgage
provided that it was "given as security for the payment of the hereinafter included note" signed by the
makers ( d~fendants), but it was also made on the
security of the makers for they promised to pay the
amount of the note irrespective of the mortgage. If
it was made partly on the security of the makers it
falls in the classification of a loan made on the se4
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curity of makers and it is defendants' contention that
it could not be made for a longer period of time than
two years from its date thereof without violating
Title 7-8-5 U.C.A 1953 which provides: "7-8-5. Certain acts forbidden.-No such corporation shall:
" ( 1) Make any loan on the security of makers,
co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors for a
longer period than two years from the date thereof."
It is plantiff's contention that there is no time
limitation on a loan such as the loan in question.
This is to say, in other words, there is no restriction
on the amount of interest a qualified and licensed
industrial loan company can charge on certain loans.
This follows from the fact that the amount of interest
that can be charged under the Industrial Loan Act,
Title 7, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953, depends on the
length of time for which a loan can be made. Paragraph 3 of Title 7, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953 provides:
General Powers.-Every industrial loan corporation
shall have power:
( 1 ) To loan money on the personal undertaking
of the borrower and other persons, or on personal
security, or otherwise, and to deduct interest thereon
in advance at the rate of one per cent or less of the
face of such loan per month, and, in addition, to
require payment in uniform weekly, semimonthly
or monthly installment~ \vith or without an allow5
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ance of interest on such installments, and to charge
a fee of $2 or less on loans of $100 or less and a maximum fee of two per cent on loans in excess of $100
for expense in examining and investigating the
character and circumstances of the borrower; provided, that such examining and investigating fee
shall not be assessed to any borrower more often than
once in each six-month period, and provided further
that no charge shall be collected unless a loan shall
have been made.
The following examples are given to show the
effect of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Title 7-8, U.C.A. 1953
if plantiff is to be sustained in its argument:
Example 1. Borrower A wishes lender L (a qualified

and licensed industrial loan corporation under Utah
law) to lend him $1,000. A has a good job and a
father to co-sign with him but has no property .to
mortgage. A wants his monthly payments to be as
low as possible. L decides to make the loan on the
security of A if his father will co-sign the note. Since
there is no mortgage involved the loan is clearly
made on the security of the maker and the co-signer
and therefore is limited to a two-year period. The
loan is made. A receives $1,000, signs a promissory
note, with his father co-signing same, promising to
pay back $1,315.78 in 24 equal monthly payments of
$54.82 per month. The actual (reaD rate of interest
A pays on the $1,000 borrowed is 30.31% per annum.
Example 2. Borrower C wishes lender L to lend him
6
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$1,000. C has a good job and a car paid for plus some
furniture on which he is willing to give a chattel
mortgage. C would like his monthly payments to be
as low as possible. Because there is a chattel mortgage
involved there is no time limit on the length of time
for which the loan can be made. L would have any
number of plans to offer for the repayment of the
loan plus the interest:
(a) Repay $54.82 each month for 24 months.
Rate of interest per year-30.31 %.
(b) Repay $43.40 each month for 36 months.
Total to be repaid would be $1,562.50 with an actual
rate of interest per year of 36.49%.
(c) Repay $40.06 each month for 48 months.
Total to be repaid would be $1,923.08 with an actual
rate of interest per year of 45.21%.
Note: In the above illustrations the amount to
be repaid and the monthly payments in each illustration have been ascertained by the same method used
by several industrial loan companies operating in
the Salt Lake area and which was approved by the
Utah Supreme Court in the Seaboard v. Wahlen case.
___ Utah
, 260 P2d 5:36. The actual rate of
interest is the rate per year on the unpaid balance
and arrived at by use of the equation R- ~(~i+l)
R is the real rate of interest, n is the number of payments per year, i is the total interest charge, P is the
7
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principal or actual amount borrowed and N is the
total number of monthly payments.
If plaintiff is sustained in its argument it would
seem that the controlling factor in the amount of
interest that can be legally charged is whether or not
the borrower gives the lender a mortgage on any of
the borrower's property. If a mortgage is given then
there is no limit on the rate of interest. If no mortgage is given and the loan is made on the security
of makers, co-makers, etc., then a limit to a mere
30.31% (approximate) per year. It is the defendant's
contention that such an interpretation of the statute
was definitely not the intent of the legislature in
passing Title 7-8-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953 but that the
intent of the legislature was to put a limitation on
the rate of interest an industrial loan corporation
could charge its borrowers.
It hardly seems reasonable that the legislature
would leave such a simple and easily found loophole
in our usury laws. Nearly every borrower will have
some assets which could be mortgaged even though
those assets might have little or no marketable value.
However, by requiring the borrower to give a mortgage on those assets (perhaps a discarded radio or a
simple piece of furniture) the lender, an industrial
loan corporation, can prescribe entirely the rate of
interest the borrower is to pay. It is common knowledge that once a borrower has reached the doors of
8
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an industrial loan corporation he has usually exhausted his efforts to obtain money from lenders with
more favorable rates of interest. With the industrial
loan corporation he will not argue terms or rates
of interest. He needs money and needs it badly or he
would not be there and will take it on any terms
he can get. If plaintiff's argument is to prevail there
is no protection for the borrower as to the rate of
interest he must pay on the money borrowed. The
entire provision limiting the length of time of industrial loan corporation loans becomes ineffectual because of such a simple manner of circumventing
same by requiring a chattel mortgage to be given in
connection with the loan.
If it had been the legislative intent to allow
industrial loan corporations to make loans secured
by chattel mortgages without time limitation and
thus vvithout restrictions on rate of interest which
could be charged, the legislature could easily have
said so.
It is obvious from Plaintiff's brief, page 8, that
there was no limitation on the length of loan made
under the 1925 act; however, that act limited the
rate of interst to a deduction of 12% per annum of
the face of the loan. The 1927 amendment changed
the 1925 act, among other things, by permitting the
deduction of interest in advance at the rate of 1%
pp~· month or less of the face of the loan instead of

9
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the 12% per annum rate of discount. However, the
legislature put a time limit of 1 year on loans made
on the security of makers, etc. If this time limitation
did not apply to loans which had as an incident
thereto a chattel mortgage, then the limitation was
meaningless because every licensed corporation need
only require a chattel mortgage (even though worthless) in order to be out of the reach of the time limitation and hence the amount of interest which could
be charged.
While the plaintiff goes to some lengths to present a persuasive argument to the effect that the
statute does not apply to loans secured by chattel
mortgages it has not shown that the loan in question
was not a loan made on the security of the makers.
The fact that the loan may have been made partly
on the security of the chattel mortgage does not
negate the fact that it also was a loan made on
the security of the makers and indeed it appears from
all reason that the chattel mortgage in question is
merely a "club" to give some assurance to the lender
that the borrower will pay the promissory note.
Plaintiff's argument should not be sustained unless
it proves that the loan in question was not made on
the security of makers. Plaintiff has attempted to
prove that the loan in question was not limited to
the two-year period because there was a chattel mortgage given. It is defendant's contention that even
though a chattel mortgage was given the loan also
10
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was made on the security of makers and as such is
limited to a two-year period.
Plaintiff has attempted to convey to this court
that the purpose of the two-year limitation was for
the protection and safe guarding of the funds of the
holders of investment certificates, etc., and also was
to apply to those loans which had no security other
than the signature of makers, co-makers, indorsers,
sureties or guarantors. (Page 11 and 12 of plaintiff's
brief.) Plaintiff's conclusion on page 12 of its brief
that "Obviously the Legislature considered that such
loans were too poor a risk for a period longer than
two years, but where other security was obtained the
risk was not as great, and loans for a longer period
might be justified" is contra the known fact that the
amount of premium one has to pay for money is determined by the amount of risk involved. Citizens
lend money to our government for rates of interest
usually less than 3% per annum. That is done because
there is little or no risk of not having said money
repaid when due.
It would be contra commonly known financial

knowledge for our legislature to put a limit on the
amount of interest that could be charged for an unsecured loan and to intend no limitation whatsoever
on a secured loan.
Plaintiff's attempt to mislead this court into be11
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lieving that the restrictions of 7-8-5 were all directed
to the protecting and safe guarding of the funds of
the holders of investment certificates instead of
ascribing sub-paragraph ( 1) 7-8-5, U.C.A. to the
protection of the borrower from excessive rates of
interest which a lender may impose is easily seen.
The 1925 act protected the borrower by providing that industrial loan corporations could not charge
more than 12% of the face of the loan. This restriction was clearly for the benefit and protection of the
borrower.
The 1927 amendment substituted the deduction
of 1% per month in advance of the face of the loan
plus requiring the borrower to make installment payments during the life of the loan without credit on
the interest in place of the 12% rate; however, to
protect the borrower the legislature placed a time
limit of 1 year on the loans and thus a limit on the
rate of interest.
The 1939 amendment increased the time limit
from one to two years. This, of course, only for the
protection of the borrower though it did allow the
lender to charge a higher rate of interest.
The following table shows the effect the length
of loan has on the real (actual) rate of interest '\-vhere
the amount of interest is 1% per month of the face of
the loan deducted in advance:
12
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Length of Loan

12
13
14
15
16
18
20
22
24
30
36
48
60

Loan Amount

Note Amount

Amount of
Interest

Real (actual)
Rate of Int.
per year on
Unpaid Bal.

Months $1,000.00 $1,136.36 $ 136.36 25.17%
Months
1,000.00 1,149.00
149.00 25.54%
Months 1,000.00 1,162.79
162.79 26.05%
Months
176.47 26.47%
1,000.00 1,176.47
Months
1,000.00 1,190.47
190.47 27.00%
219.51 27.73%
Months
1,000.00 1,219.51
250.00 28.57%
Months
1,000.00 1,250.00
282.05 29.43%
Months
1,000.00 1,282.05
Months
315.78 30.31%
1,000.00 1,315.78
Months
428.57 33.18%
1,000.00 1,428.57
Months
1,000.00 1,562.50
562.50 36.49%
Months
923.08 45.21%
1,000.00 1,923.08
Months
1,000.00 2,500.00 1,500.00 59.01%

From that table it is easy to see why it was
necessary for the legislature to put a time limit on
the loans of an industrial loan corporation. Not to
protect the owners of certificate holders of industrial
loan corporations as Plaintiff would have this court
believe (page 11 Plaintiff's brief), but rather to give
some protection to the borrower by limiting the rate
of interest the lender can charge. What magic is
there in a chattel mortgage, which may or may not
have value, which renders the loan one that needs
no protection by the legislature as to interest to be
charged? Plaintiff's entire argument on Point I is
that the chattel mortgage makes the difference13
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takes the loan out of the protected class and that the
legislature intended that chattel mortgage loans be
exempt from length and interest rate restrictions.
In answer to plaintiff's argument relative to previous interpretation defendants contend that this
court should not be bound or persuaded in any degree
by the Bank Commissioner's interpretation of the
intent of the Industrial Loan Act or by the writer
of the recent note cited on page 15 of plaintiff's brief.
As far as defendants have been able to ascertain this
is the first time the question of interpretating the
meaning of "a loan made on the security of makers"
has come before this court and this court only shall
make that determination.
The Commissioner's opinion as expressed in the
above cited letter merely invites subterfuge and tends
to license industrial loan corporations in violating
the legislature's intent to restrict the amount of interest on industrial loan corporation loans.
If this court decides that the mere giving of a
chattel mortgage n1akes the loan one that is not made
on the security of the maker then of course 7-8-5 ( 1 )
U.C.A. 1953 will be rendered utterly useless as all
industrial loan corporations 'viii require a chattel
mortgage in order to be outside the scope of length
of time and rate of interest limitations.
The statutes from other jurisdiction cited by
14
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plaintiff, pages 15 to 18 of its brief, show that each
state in one way or another restricts the rates of interest of industrial loan corporation loans.
On page 16-0regon-Loans made on the sole
security of makers limited to 18 months. Loans secured by chattel mortgages limited to two years.
On page 17 -Connecticut- All I o an s - 36
months except real estate loans. Maine-Two years
on all loans except loans eligible for insurance under
National Housing Act. New York-All loans, except
real estate, for period of two years. Tennessee- (Page
18 of plaintiff's brief.) All loans limited to two years.
To construe our statute as plaintiff contends
would mean that it should be read as if it were written "No corporation under the provision of this act,
shall make any loan on the SOLE security of makers,
etc." Plaintiff, itself, argues against such judicial legislation-Page 18 and 19 of plaintiff's brief.
Our legislature purposely worded 7-8-5 ( 1) as
it now stands. Any loan which is made on the security of makers (where the maker is liable for the
payment of the loan plus interest regardless of any
security he might pledge or mortgage) should be
limited as to the rate of interest that loan can provide. Certainly if a loan is made on the security of
pledged or mortgaged property no such restrictions
are necessary as the value of such mortgaged or

15
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pledged property will determine the total amount
the borrower is willing to repay for the loan. That
security will liquidate the loan, if the borrower does
not repay.
Plaintiff's statement on page 19 of its brief that
the agreed Statement of Record in this matter shows
the loan in this case to be secured by a chattel mortgage is misleading in that the agreed Statement of
Record shows that "the note was executed by the
defendants on May 31, 1952 whereby they agreed
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,376.88 and
that the "proceeds of any sale made pursuant either
to the foreclosure of the mortgage or by notice and
sale according to law would be applied first to the
payment of charges and then to the payment of the
principal balance due on mortgagor's note in aq:ordance with its terms, and that the mortgagor would
be liable for any deficiency," page 2 of plaintiff's
brief.
The note and mortgage in question providing
for judgment against the makers (defendants) for
any deficiency and the plaintiff's prayer in its complaint for said deficiency judgment clearly shows
that the loan in question was made on the security
of the makers. As such it must have been limited in
time to tlie two-year period as provided by Title 7-8-5
( 1) U.C.A. 1953.

16
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Consequently the fact that a chattel mortgage
was executed in the instant case has no effect on the
status of the loan. The loan was made on the security
of the makers (defendants) and was limited to the·
two-year length as provided by 7-8-5 (1) U.C.A.
1963. Be£ause the loan exceeded that time limit it
could not be made under the provisions of that act
and thus the j;udgment of the trial court should be
affirmed~

ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAlNT AND GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.

As was set forth in the agreed Statement of Record on appeal the parties stipulated that the interest
charged by the plaintiff on said loan was in excess of
the 10% per annum simple interest as allowed by
15-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. The loan in question showed
upon its face that it was made for a longer period of
time than two years.
The plaintiff is a licensed industrial loan corporation and to make loans under the provisions of 7-8U.C.A 1953 (Industrial Loan Corporation Act) it
17
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must abide by the restrictions of that act. Title 7-8-5
( 1) forbids any such corporation from making any
loan on the security of makers * * * for a longer
period than two years from the date thereof. Any
loan made by an industrial loan corporation on the
security of makers (borrowers) must be limited to
the two-year period, regardless of the amount of interest charged, in order to come within the provisions of the Industrial Loan Act and if the loan does
not come under said act it must be limited to the rate
of interest allowed by our general interest law-Title
15-1 U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff stipulated that the interest charged was
in excess of that allowed by Title 15-1 U.C.A. 1953
and because said loan was made on the security of
makers (defendant) and forbidden by 7-8-5 ( 1) as
a loan under the Industrial Loan Act, it is apparent
that the defendants' motion was properly taken and
that the trial court was correct in granting said
motion.
While it is true that the result of the trial courts
decision is forfeiture, that court is only carrying out
the intent of legislature. Forfeiture in any case seems
a harsh remedy, yet, we do not question the right
of our legislature to determine when forfeiture should
take place. Under our general usury statute a lender
may charge only 10% per annum on the unpaid balance. Under the special act for industrial loan corpo18
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rations, a qualified lender may charge up to 30.31%
per annum, plus investigation fee and this court has
held recently that the rate could be 3 7% pl~ and
still be within the statute.
This seems ~ high rate of interest yet the right
of the legislature to allow such a rate is not questioned.
Defendants contend that the industrial loan act
should be strictly construed and in order for an industrial loan corporation to enjoy its benefits (high
rate of interest) it must comply strictly with its provisions.
The plaintiff has not complied with those provisions hence it should not be entitled to the benefits
of those provisions. The plaintiff, itself is a creature
of statute, and those statutes regulating its conduct
and granting its benefits must be strictly construed.
The purpose or reason for making a loan longer than
two years is immaterial. The legislature did not say
such loans could be made for longer period than two
years provided the lender did not charge any more
interest on the loan for such period but rather the
legislature said the loan, such as that in question, for
a longer period than two years is forbidden.
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CONCLUSION

The loan in question was made on the security
of the makers (defendants) and was forbidden by
7-8-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953 as an indusrialloan corporation loan and because of that plus the fact that the
plaintiff stipulated the amount of interest was in
excess of that allowed by Title 15-1 U.C.A. the trial
courts decision was correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MAXWELL BENTLEY
Attorney for Respondents
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